Obama's Housing Bubble Coming? Obama Wants to Expand Community Reinvestment Act

Bill Clinton's Community Reinvestment Act encouraged banks to lend to people who couldn't afford a mortgage. Most of them barely got by and then energy prices started going up, and a large percentage of Americans soon stopped paying their mortgages. I don't need to tell you what happened next, but I will give you a hint. Does the words foreclosures and bank bailouts come to mind?

Well, Obama didn't learn from Clinton's mistake. Obama wants to expand the Community Reinvestment Act. Luckily for us, Investors Business Daily is exposing this and separating the fact from fiction in hopes of avoiding another disaster. Unfortunately for us, most who serve in Washington are complete idiots and will probably allow this to happen.

In light of the Obama administration's stated goal of expanding the CRA, separating fact from fiction regarding this issue is of towering importance — to set the historic record straight and to prevent another financial calamity.

FICTION: Because the CRA was passed in 1977, long before the subprime crisis, it couldn't have caused the recent explosion in bad loans.

FACT: The toothless 1977 regulations fully expired in July 1997, when President Clinton rewrote them to toughen CRA enforcement as part of a crusade to close the "mortgage gap" between blacks and whites.

For the first time, banks were required to show results. One of the five performance criteria in the "lending test" — the most heavily weighted component of the CRA exam — was adopting "flexible lending practices" to address the credit needs of poor borrowers in "predominantly minority neighborhoods." Banks that didn't bend their underwriting rules risked flunking the exam.

Ex-Federal Reserve Board Gov. Lawrence Lindsey, a staunch CRA defender, acknowledges that the changes "did contribute to a downgrading of credit standards."

FICTION: "Many of these (CRA) loans were not very risky," the FCIC report claims.

FACT: Studies show that CRA loans have higher delinquencies and defaults and act as a major drag on bank earnings. In 2008, CRA loans accounted for just 7% of Bank of America's total mortgage lending, but 29% of its losses on home loans. Also, banks with the highest CRA ratings tend to have the lowest safety and soundness ratings.

FICTION: Only 6% of subprime loans were originated by banks subject to the CRA, so the vast majority of risky lending was not tied to the law.

FACT: Among other things, the figure does not count the trillions of dollars in CRA "commitments" that WaMu, BofA, JPMorgan Chase, Citibank, Wells Fargo and other large banks pledged to radical inner-city groups like Acorn, Greenlining and Neighborhood Assistance Corp. of America (NACA) after they used the public comment process to protest bank merger applications on CRA grounds.

All told, they shook down banks for $4.6 trillion in such commitments before the crisis, boasts a report by the National Community Reinvestment Coalition, or NCRC, the nation's top CRA lobbyist (which conveniently removed the report from its website during the FCIC hearings).

FICTION: "These loans performed well," the FCIC report maintained.

FACT: Brookings found that the loan commitments were set aside for low-income minorities with "marginal credit scores" and posed a higher risk. They were even riskier than regular CRA loans, because the banks delegated underwriting authority to the nonprofit shakedown groups, which had no experience judging credit risk.

NACA thinks traditional underwriting standards are "patronizing and racist." It advertises that anyone — "regardless of how bad your credit is" — can qualify for the mortgages it's arranged through special deals with banks. Not surprisingly, one study found that its delinquency rates were eight times higher than the national average.

Banks reported delinquency rates ranging from 5% to 50% on loans made pursuant to their merger-related commitments.

Yet the FCIC refused to investigate the more than 300 CRA agreements that banks and community organizers entered into before the subprime bubble burst.

Despite repeated requests by Commissioner Peter Wallison, the panel never examined the performance of the trillions in loan commitments.

Why would Chairman Angelides steer blame away from the CRA? Because he's a big fan of the CRA. And as California state treasurer, from 1999 to 2007, he steered billions in state funds into unsafe CRA mortgages securitized by Freddie Mac.

At the time, Greenlining advised Angelides on where to invest California state funds, even providing him with its own CRA report card on "good" and "bad" banks. He has also personally benefited from CRA projects brokered by his real estate development firms, according to "The Great American Bank Robbery."

As part of the CRA racket, Angelides should have been a witness in the crisis investigation, not its chief inquisitor. With the cover-up complete, he now hopes that CRA critics will go away.

"The debate about the role of the CRA should now be over as evidence presented in the commission's report is clear," Angelides declared earlier this month.

Sorry, sir, but the debate will end when the public has all the facts, not just your cooked report.